










































A Logical Theory of Localization
Citation for published version:
Belle, V & Levesque, HJ 2016, 'A Logical Theory of Localization' Studia Logica, vol. 104, no. 4, pp. 741-772.
DOI: 10.1007/s11225-015-9625-0
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1007/s11225-015-9625-0
Link:






Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 23
Studia Logica







A Logical Theory of Localization
Vaishak Belle & Hector J. Levesque
1 23
Your article is protected by copyright and all
rights are held exclusively by Springer Science
+Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint
is for personal use only and shall not be self-
archived in electronic repositories. If you wish
to self-archive your article, please use the
accepted manuscript version for posting on
your own website. You may further deposit
the accepted manuscript version in any
repository, provided it is only made publicly
available 12 months after official publication
or later and provided acknowledgement is
given to the original source of publication
and a link is inserted to the published article
on Springer's website. The link must be
accompanied by the following text: "The final
publication is available at link.springer.com”.
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A Logical Theory of
Localization
Abstract. A central problem in applying logical knowledge representation formalisms to
traditional robotics is that the treatment of belief change is categorical in the former, while
probabilistic in the latter. A typical example is the fundamental capability of localization
where a robot uses its noisy sensors to situate itself in a dynamic world. Domain designers
are then left with the rather unfortunate task of abstracting probabilistic sensors in terms of
categorical ones, or more drastically, completely abandoning the inner workings of sensors
to black-box probabilistic tools and then interpreting their outputs in an abstract way.
Building on a ﬁrst-principles approach by Bacchus, Halpern and Levesque, and a recent
continuous extension to it by Belle and Levesque, we provide an axiomatization that shows
how localization can be realized wrt a basic action theory, thereby demonstrating how such
capabilities can be enabled in a single logical framework. We then show how the framework
can also enable localization for multiple agents, where an agent can appeal to the sensing
already performed by another agent and the knowledge of their relative positions to localize
itself.
Keywords: Knowledge representation; Reasoning about action; Reasoning about
knowledge and belief; Multi-agent logics.
1. Introduction
Cognitive robotics, as envisioned in [33,35], is a high-level control paradigm
that attempts to apply knowledge representation (KR) technologies to the
reasoning problems faced by an autonomous agent, such as a robot, in an
incompletely known dynamic world. It is a challenging endeavor: in the least,
reasonable features of action and change, such as the frame and ramiﬁcation
problems, need addressing, but if the robot has limited information then
acting, sensing, knowledge and belief change also need to be taken into
account. To this end, in the case of a popular action formalism such as
the situation calculus [46], one usually provides a set of logical sentences
called a basic action theory which explicates in a precise way the properties
of the world and their relation to the agent’s sensors and eﬀectors. The
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beneﬁt of appealing to such logical languages, of course, is that they admit
non-trivial action speciﬁcations and arbitrary kinds of strict uncertainty,
via disjunctions and quantiﬁcation. When that is further supported using
complex actions and procedures in the sense of a programming language [36,
54], one obtains a powerful and general methodology for designing intelligent
agents, seen for example in [12,24,33].
Although a tight pairing of sensor data and high-level control is indeed
what is desired, typical sensor data is best treated probabilistically [55] while
many knowledge change accounts are categorical [17], that is, they do not
represent and reason about changing degrees of belief. This has led to a
major criticism that these logical formalisms are not realistic for applications
involving actual physical robots. Indeed, a domain designer is now left with
the rather unfortunate task of modeling probabilistic sensors in terms of non-
probabilistic ones, an extreme being noise-free sensors [49], which would lead
to an inaccurate model. More drastically, designers may completely abandon
the inner workings of sensors to black-box probabilistic tools, in which case
their outputs would need to be interpreted in some qualitative fashion and
so is not straightforward. Regardless of application domains where such a
move might be appropriate, for computational reasons or otherwise, both of
these limitations are very serious since they challenge the underlying theory
as a genuine characterization of the agent. Other major concerns include:
(a) the loss of granularity, as it is not clear at the outset which aspect of the
sensor data is being approximated and by how much, and (b) the domain
designer is at the mercy of her intuition to imagine the various ways sensors
might get used.
A ﬁrst-principles proposal by Bacchus et al. [2], BHL henceforth, is per-
haps the most general account to rectify this problem. Embedded in the
usual machinery of a basic action theory, the BHL scheme enriches the
situation calculus with an account of probabilistic nondeterminism. The
enrichment allows us to talk about belief change in the formalism, which
is compatible with earlier accounts on knowledge [49] while also subsum-
ing Bayesian conditioning [44]. In contrast to many probabilistic formalisms
(see the penultimate section for more on this), it allows for partial speciﬁ-
cations, that is, distributions where only some of the ﬂuents in the domain
may be provided, as well as strict uncertainty. Recently, we [5] have fur-
ther extended the BHL framework to reason about noise that is continuous.
Building on these results, we now consider the most basic capability needed
for an autonomous agent to situate itself: the localization problem. Roughly
speaking, given a spatial characterization of the robot’s environment, the
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robot is to identify its pose (location and orientation) to a reasonable cer-
tainty using the sensors at its disposal.1 We then show how the framework
can also enable localization for multiple agents, where an agent can appeal
to the sensing already performed by another agent and the knowledge of
their relative positions to localize itself.
Localization has been addressed using a number of algorithmic techniques
for more than two decades in the robotics literature [14,55], including in the
multi-agent context [21]. Our objective will not be to compete with these
techniques; in fact, this paper will not concern itself with algorithms at all.
Rather, we want to show how localization can be understood as part of a
larger eﬀort in a single logical framework [46]. To the best of our knowledge,
this has not been attempted before. Nevertheless, we remark that owing to
the ﬁrst-order nature of the formalism, our account of localization, among
other capabilities, is signiﬁcantly more general than most, if not all, proba-
bilistic formalisms.
The agenda for this paper will be as follows. We ﬁrst introduce the pre-
liminaries for reasoning about degrees of belief in the logical language of the
situation calculus. We then iteratively develop the steps needed to localize
a robot in an uncertain world, and ﬁnally consider a multi-agent setting. As
one would expect, given the domain axiomatization, we show that localiza-
tion is realized entirely within the logic in terms of belief change. Perhaps
most signiﬁcantly, we demonstrate how the framework subsumes probabilis-
tic formalisms by using the full range of situation calculus successor state
axioms and sensing axioms. We then discuss related eﬀorts and conclude.
2. The Situation Calculus
The language L of the situation calculus [40] is a many-sorted dialect of
predicate calculus, with sorts for actions, situations and objects. It is a
special-purpose knowledge representation for reasoning about action and
change. We assume familiarity with the language and discuss it informally
below; for a comprehensive treatment, interested readers are referred to [46].
A situation represents a world history as a sequence of actions. A set of
initial situations correspond to the ways the world might be initially. Succes-
sor situations are the result of doing actions, where the term do(a, s) denotes
the unique situation obtained on doing a in situation s. The term do(α, s),
where α is the sequence [a1, . . . , an] abbreviates do(an, do(. . . , do(a1, s) . . . )).
1In the absence of an intricate spatial setup, a simpler account of a robot situating
itself is possible, as in [7], for example.
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For example, do([drop(o), repair(o)], s) denotes the situation obtained on
dropping o in s and then repairing it. Initial situations are deﬁned as those
without a predecessor:
Init(s) .= ¬∃a, s′. s = do(a, s′).
We let the constant S0 denote the actual initial situation (that is, the state
of the world before any actions have occurred), and we use the variable ι to
range over initial situations only (that is, the states of all worlds before any
actions have occurred). (When describing the domain, the modeler would
provide sentences about S0, thereby indicating what the domain is actually
like initially.) In each model of L, the situations can be structured into a set
of trees, where the root of each tree is an initial situation and the edges are
actions.
In dynamical domains, we want the values of predicate and functions
to vary from situation to situation. For this purpose, L includes ﬂuents
whose last argument is always a situation. Here we assume without loss of
generality that all ﬂuents are functional.
We follow some notational conventions. Free variables are assumed to
be implicitly quantiﬁed from the outside. We often suppress the situation
argument in a formula φ, or use a distinguished variable now. Either way,
φ[t] is used to denote the formula with that variable replaced by t. We often
introduce formula and term abbreviations that are meant to expand as L-
formulas. For example, we might introduce a new formula A (not in the
language) by A .= φ where φ ∈ L. Then any expression E(A) containing A
is assumed to mean E(φ). Analogously, if we introduce a new term t (not in
the language) by t = u .= φ(u) then any expression E(t) is assumed to mean
∃u(E(u) ∧ φ(u)). These conventions are used for convenience only, and do
not require any extension to the version of the formalism introduced in [46].
2.1. Basic Action Theory
Following [46], we model dynamic domains in L by means of a basic action
theory D, which are a set of sentences consisting of:2
1. Sentences D0 that describe what is true in the initial states, including
S0;
2. Precondition axioms of the form Poss(a, s) ≡ ϕ describing the conditions
under which actions are executable;
2As usual, free variables in any of these axioms should be understood as universally
quantiﬁed from the outside.
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3. Successor state axioms of the form f(do(a, s)) = u ≡ γf (a, u, s) deter-
mining the ﬂuent values on executing actions, following the format of
Reiter’s monotonic solution to the frame problem [46];
4. Domain-independent foundational axioms, including, for example, a
second-order induction axiom enabling a tree of situations as described
above. The details of this need not concern us here; see [46].
Given such a basic action theory D, a fundamental reasoning task is that of
projection [46] where given a property φ and a sequence of actions a1, . . . , ak,
we are interested in whether:
D |= φ(do([a1, . . . , ak], S0))?
Projection underlies a number of other intricate tasks, including plan syn-
thesis where we are to verify whether some action sequence satisﬁes a given
goal condition. Entailment is understood wrt standard ﬁrst-order (Tarskian)
models. We assume henceforth that models also assign the usual interpre-
tations to =, <,>, 0, 1,+,×, /,−, e, π and xy (exponentials).
Following [5], in the sequel, we will be assuming that f1, . . . , fk are all the
ﬂuents in L, and that they only take a single situation term as an argument.3
Note that we still allow these ﬂuents to range over any set, including the
reals R.
2.2. Belief, Likelihood and Continuous Noise
A ﬁrst-principles approach to enrich the standard situation calculus to rea-
son about noisy sensors and belief change was developed by BHL [2]. It
builds on an earlier treatment of knowledge [42,49] that mirrors modal logic
[28,31] in putting forth a possible-worlds interpretation, that is, situations
are treated as possible worlds. (As a consequence, unlike classical modal
logic, worlds are thus reiﬁed in the language.) In the main, it is based on
two distinguished binary ﬂuents l and p.
The term l(a, s) is intended to denote the likelihood of action a in situation
s. The axioms for l vary from domain to domain, but they have the general
form of l(A(x), s) = u ≡ φA(x, u, s) which characterizes the conditions
under which action type A has likelihood u in s. For example, suppose
sonar(z) is the action of reading the value z from a sensor that measures
3Basically, as observed in [5], if ﬂuents are allowed to take arguments from inﬁnite sets,
then that can be seen to result in joint probability distributions over uncountably many
random variables. We have as yet no good ideas about how to deal with it. (It remains
to be seen whether probability theory on high dimensions [10,15] can be adapted for the
purposes of a model of belief.)
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the distance to the wall, h. We might assume that this action is characterized
by a Gaussian error model:
l(sonar(z), s) = u ≡
(z ≥ 0 ∧ u = N (z − h(s);μ, σ2)) ∨ (z < 0 ∧ u = 0)
which stipulates that the diﬀerence between a nonnegative reading of z and
the true value h is normally distributed with a variance of σ2 and mean of
μ.4
Next, the p ﬂuent determines a probability distribution on situations.
The term p(s′, s) denotes the relative weight accorded to situation s′ when
the agent happens to be in situation s. The properties of p in initial states,
which vary from domain to domain, are speciﬁed by axioms as part of D0, as
one would for any other functional ﬂuent (examples are discussed shortly).
Now, to give p the required properties, so that it behaves like a probability
distributions, two axioms are needed. First, a nonnegative constraint on p
is assumed to be included in D0:
∀ι, s. p(s, ι) ≥ 0 ∧ (p(s, ι) > 0 ⊃ Init(s)).
(While this is indeed a stipulation about initial states ι only, by means of
the next axiom, the nonnegative constraint continues to hold everywhere.)
Second, a successor state axiom of the following form is provided for the p
ﬂuent:
p(s′, do(a, s)) = u ≡
∃s′′ [s′ = do(a, s′′) ∧ Poss(a, s′′) ∧ u = p(s′′, s) × l(a, s′′)]
∨ ¬∃s′′ [s′ = do(a, s′′) ∧ Poss(a, s′′) ∧ u = 0].
This successor state axiom states that, given an appropriate action likelihood
axiom, the weight of situations s′ relative to do(a, s) is the weight of their
predecessors s′′ times the likelihood of a contingent on the successful execu-
tion of a at s′′. One consequence of these two axioms is that (p(s′, s) > 0)
will be true only when s′ and s share the same history of actions.
Putting it all together, if φ is a formula with a single free variable of sort








4Note that N is a continuous distribution involving π, e, exponentiation, and so on.
Therefore, BHL always consider discrete probability distributions that approximate the
continuous ones.
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where γ is the normalization factor and is understood throughout as the




′, s). So, similar to proposals such as [20], belief in φ is simply the
total weight of worlds satisfying φ. (We remark that the summation symbol
is not an extension to the logical language L but stands for a formula using
second-order quantiﬁcation; see BHL for details.)
While the BHL deﬁnition of belief is simple and intuitive, a major lim-
itation of their work is the restriction to discrete probability distributions,
since the Bel-expression is well-deﬁned only when the sum over situations is
well-deﬁned. This is in contrast to the continuous noise usually encountered
in robotics [55]. This limitation has been recently lifted in [5]. The main idea,
which we only summarize here, is to ﬁrst insist on a precise space of initial
situations. So, in addition to the non-negative stipulation and the successor
state axiom for p, a new axiom is included in D0 to impress exactly one
initial situation for any vector of ﬂuent values, following [37]. We list these
three axioms in Table 1. With this addition, letting φ be any formula with
a single free variable of sort situation, the degree of belief in φ is simply







where Density(x, φ, s) is an abbreviation that, roughly speaking, returns the
unnormalized density associated with φ at s:
Density(x, φ, do(α, S0)) = u
.=
∃ι [∧ fi(ι) = xi ∧ φ[do(α, ι)] ∧ u = p(do(α, ι), do(α, S0))]
∨ ¬∃ι [∧ fi(ι) = xi ∧ φ[do(α, ι)] ∧ u = 0].
The intuition is as follows. Using (iii), we obtain a bijection between initial
situations and ﬂuent values. By integrating over x in the usual mathemat-
ical sense, we simply pick the appropriate initial situation, test whether φ
holds after doing α and use the corresponding p value. We have assumed
for simplicity that all ﬂuents take values over R, and so for discrete ﬂuents,
one would simply replace the integral with a summation (over its possible
values) where appropriate. (We remark that, similar to the summation sym-
bol in BHL’s deﬁnition of belief,
∫
x
is a not an addition the logical language
but only a term formalized using second-order logic that corresponds to
mathematical integration; see [5] for details.)
The above, put together, is the full proposal. In sum, the following com-
ponents were needed:
• abbreviations Bel and Density that expand as L-expressions;
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i. ∀ι, s. p(s, ι) ≥ 0 ∧ (p(s, ι) > 0 ⊃ Init(s)).
ii. p(s′, do(a, s)) = u ≡
∃s′′ [s′ = do(a, s′′) ∧ Poss(a, s′′)∧ u = p(s′′, s) × l(a, s′′)]
∨ ¬∃s′′ [s′ = do(a, s′′) ∧ Poss(a, s′′) ∧ u = 0].
iii. (∀x∃ι∧ fi(ι) = xi) ∧ (∀ι, ι′.
∧
fi(ι) = fi(ι′) ⊃ ι = ι′).
Table 1. Axioms in D for p
• an initial theory about S0, including (iii) to accommodate multiple initial
situations and p’s initial constraint (i);
• action likelihood axioms using l;
• successor state and precondition axioms, including (ii) for p.
In the sequel, we assume action theories to include (i), (ii) and (iii).
Finally, it is worth noting that the account of belief change using Bel
subsumes Bayesian conditioning [2,5], which is requisite for capturing mech-
anisms such as localization [55].
3. Axiomatizing Localization
One of the signiﬁcant features about the BHL scheme and its continuous
variant is that robot localization, among other capabilities, follows logically
from a basic action theory. No new foundational axioms are necessary. In
fact, localization is a certain degree of belief regarding position and orien-
tation, and so by reasoning about belief change in terms of projection [46],
the robot would get localized. On the one hand, this is perhaps expected
as many state estimation techniques in robotics are based on Bayesian con-
ditioning, but on the other, we are demonstrating this capability in a very
rich ﬁrst-order framework.
In this section, we develop a simple example, adapted from [55], and a
basic action theory corresponding to this example. Localization will then
be demonstrated in terms of logical entailments of the action theory. We
think many of the features of our example are suggestive of how one would
approach more complex domains. In the main, the example involves the
following steps:
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Figure 1. Two walls and a robot
• a characterization of the environment (walls, doors, etc.);
• a characterization of the uncertainty of the robot about this environment
(its position and orientation); and
• a characterization of the robot’s actions and sensors, and how they
depend on and aﬀect the environment.
Our example imagines a robot in a two-dimensional grid, equipped with
a moving action and distance sensor, and facing two parallel walls as in
Fig. 1. The basic action theory D developed for the above items of this
domain will be built using three ﬂuents h (horizontal position), v (vertical
position) and θ (orientation) that will determine the pose of the robot, a
single rigid predicate Solid used to axiomatize the environment, two action
types move(z, w) and rotate(z) that determine how the robot moves and how
these aﬀect the ﬂuents using successor state axioms, a single sensing action
sonar(z), and convenient abbreviations that expand into formulas involving
the aforementioned logical symbols. Of course, we assume D to also mention
Poss, l and p, which are distinguished L-symbols. We reiterate that we will
not need any machinery beyond Reiter’s version [46].
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3.1. Environment
The very ﬁrst item on the agenda is the notion of a map, which for our pur-
pose will simply mean an axiomatic formulation of the physical space. In our
example, suppose that the two parallel walls are 10 units long. The one on
the extreme left of the robot, which we refer to as WallFar in the sequel, is
without any doors, while the one that is adjacent to the robot, referred to as
WallClose, has 3 open doors. The doors extend for one unit each. As can
be seen in Fig. 1, we are imagining a coordinate system that has WallFar
on the Y -axis, and puts the bottom edge of WallFar at the origin.
For our purposes, we develop a simple axiomatization to describe this
physical space. (More general formalizations are possible, of course; see,
for example, [23,34].) We think of the walls in terms of continuous solid
segments, that is, WallFar is considered to be a single chunk, while
WallClose is thought of as 4 components. We will ignore the thickness of
walls for simplicity. In precise terms, let Solid(x, y, d) indicate that begin-
ning at the coordinate (x, y), one ﬁnds a solid structure of length d extending
from (x, y) to (x, y + d). Of course, we are using a rigid predicate because
walls are stationary; for dynamic objects, such as the robot, ﬂuents will
iv. {Solid(0, 0, 10),Solid(5, 0, 1),Solid(5, 2, 1),Solid(5, 4, 3),Solid(5, 8, 2)}.
v. Poss(a) ≡ true.
vi. h(do(a, s)) = u ≡
¬∃z, w(a = move(z, w)) ∧ u = h(s) ∨
∃z, w(a = move(z, w) ∧ u = max(δ(s), h(s) − z · cos(w))).
vii. v(do(a, s)) = u ≡
¬∃z, w(a = move(z, w)) ∧ u = v(s) ∨
∃z, w(a = move(z, w) ∧ u = v(s) + z · sin(w)).
viii. θ(do(a, s)) = u ≡
¬∃z(a = rotate(z) ∧ u = θ(s)) ∨
∃z(a = rotate(z) ∧ u = (((θ(s) + z)mod 360) − 180)).
ix. {l(move(z, w), s) = 1, l(rotate(z), s) = 1}.
x. l(sonar(z), s) = u ≡
Blocked(s) ∧ u = N (δ/ cos(θ) − z; 0, 1)[s] ∨
¬Blocked(s) ∧ u = N ((δ + λ)/ cos(θ) − z; 0, 1)[s].
Table 2. A basic action theory for the domain
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be used. With this idea, we could characterize (say) WallFar by includ-
ing Solid(0, 0, 10) in D0. For both walls, then, D0 is assumed to include the
formulas (iv) from Table 2.
It should be clear that one may easily extract various directional and
spatial relationships between such objects as appropriate. For example,
although entirely obvious here, to calculate the distance between the walls,
one may deﬁne an abbreviation λ as follows:
λ = u .= ∃x, y, d, x′, y′, d′. Solid(x, y, d) ∧ Solid(x′, y′, d′) ∧
x 
= x′ ∧ u = |x − x′|.
3.2. Robot: Physical Actions
Here, we characterize the robot’s position, and how that is aﬀected using
physical actions.
The pose of the robot is given by three ﬂuents: h, v and θ, where h is
the horizontal position, v is the vertical position and so (h, v) is the robot’s
location, and θ is the orientation. We let θ range from −180 to 180 (degrees),
with θ = 0 indicating that the robot is perpendicular to WallFar and
directed towards it, and θ = 90 indicating that the robot is perpendicular
to the X-axis and directed towards the positive half of the Y -axis.
We imagine two physical action types at the robot’s disposal, move(z, w)
and rotate(z). We are thinking that the robot is capable of moving z units
along the orientation w (degrees) wrt its angular frame. That is, for w = 0,
the robot would move z units towards WallFar, and for w = 90, the robot
would move z units along the positive Y -axis, i.e. parallel to WallFar.
The robot can also orient itself in-place, using rotate(z). For these actions,
one also needs to specify their preconditions, and their likelihood axioms.
In this work, we make two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume these
and all other actions in domain (including the sensing action to be discussed
shortly) are always executable, given by (v). Second, we assume the physical
actions are noise-free. (The sensor will be noisy, however, as we shall see.)
Thus, likelihood axioms, which are used to specify probabilistic nondeter-
minism, will be given by (ix) for these actions. Essentially, (ix) says that the
likelihood is 1 for these actions. (Noisy physical actions in the BHL scheme
are illustrated, for example, in [9].)
The values of ﬂuents may change after actions. The sentence (ii) already
speciﬁes how p behaves in successor situations. We now do the same for
h, v and θ. Since move(z) and rotate(z) are the only physical actions, the
successor state axioms for h, v and θ will only mention these actions. They
are given as (vi), (vii) and (viii) respectively. Let us consider them in order.
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In the case of h, we would like move(z, 0) to bring the robot z units
towards the wall on its left, but that motion should stop if the robot hits
the wall. For this, it is perhaps easiest to ﬁrst infer the distance between the
robot and the closest wall on its left. This can be done as follows. For an
arbitrary coordinate (x∗, y∗), we deﬁne an abbreviation for the nearest wall
on its left:
NearestLeft(x∗, y∗) = d .= ∃x, y, d. Solid(x, y, d) ∧ y∗ ∈ [y, y + d] ∧
¬∃x′, y′, d′. Solid(x′, y′, d′) ∧ y∗ ∈ [y′, y′ + d′] ∧
(x∗ − x′) < (x∗ − x) ∧ d = (x∗ − x).
We use u ∈ [v, w] to mean u ≥ v ∧ u ≤ w, as usual. To now extract the
distance between the robot and the nearest wall on its left, simply deﬁne an
abbreviation δ as follows:
δ(s) = u .= u = NearestLeft(h(s), v(s)).
This now allows us to dissect (vi). It says that move(z, w) is the only action
aﬀecting h, thereby incorporating Reiter’s monotonic solution to the frame
problem, and it decrements h by z cos(w) units but stops if the robot hits
the nearest wall on its left. Note that, then, the value of h will become δ. For
example, if θ = 0, then the new value of h is simply decremented by z, and
if θ = 180, which would mean the robot is facing away from WallClose
then h would be incremented by z (since cos(180) is -1.)
For the ﬂuent v, the treatment is analogous, as shown in (vii). That is,
the action move(z, w) would increment v by z ·sin(θ). For example, if z = 90,
then the move action would simply increment v since the motion would be
along the Y -axis in an incremental fashion. Naturally, if one were to give a
negative argument, say −3, to move, then the robot would move from (h, v)
to (h, v − 3).
Finally, θ is manipulated using rotate(z) in an incremental manner while
keeping its range in [−180, 180] in (viii).
3.3. Robot: Sensors
The robot is assumed to have a sonar unit on its frontal surface, that is,
along θ. We take this sensor to be noisy. What this means is that if the robot
is facing WallClose, then a reading z from the sensor may diﬀer from δ,
but perhaps in some reasonable way. Most sensors have additive Gaussian
noise [55], which is to say the likelihood of z is obtained from a normal curve
whose mean is δ.
The complication here is that there are two walls and depending on the
robot’s pose, the sensor might be measuring either δ or λ + δ. For example,
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if h ∈ [0, 1] and θ = 0, we understand that the sonar’s signals would likely be
centered around δ. However, if v < 1 but the robot’s orientation is such that
the sonar’s signals advance through the gap at [1, 2], then the robot’s sonar
unit would suggest values closer to δ + λ rather than δ alone. To provide a
satisfactory l-axiom for the sensor, let us ﬁrst introduce an abbreviation for
what it means for a sensor’s signals to stop at WallClose:
Blocked(s) .= ∃x, y, d. Solid(x, y, d) ∧ h(s) = x + δ(s) ∧
(v + δ · tan(θ))[s] ∈ [y, y + d].
To make sense of this in (converse) terms of when signals would reach
WallFar, note that if v < 1 and yet v + tan(θ) ∈ [1, 2], then the sig-
nal advances through the gap. Analogously, if θ < 0 and v > 2 and yet
v + tan(θ) ∈ [1, 2], then the signal advances through as well. This then
allows us to deﬁne an l axiom for the sonar in (x). Intuitively, when Blocked
holds at situation s, we assume the sonar’s reading to have additive Gaussian
noise (with unit variance) centered around δ, but when the sonar’s signals
can reach WallFar, we assume its reading to have additive Gaussian noise
(with unit variance) centered around δ +λ. (The N term is an abbreviation
for the mathematical formula deﬁning a Gaussian density.)
3.4. Initial Constraints
The ﬁnal step is to decide on a p speciﬁcation for the domain. Recall that
the p ﬂuent is used to formalize the (probabilistic) uncertainty that the
robot has about the domain. This perhaps accounts for a major diﬀerence
between the work here and almost all probabilistic formalisms. For us, in
a sense, p is just another ﬂuent function, allowing the domain modeler to
provide incomplete and partial speciﬁcations. But since our objective in this
paper will be to show, in the least, that robot localization behaves as it does
in standard probabilistic formalisms, we discuss two examples with fully
known joint distributions in the next section. There are other possibilities
still, a discussion of which we defer to later.
4. Properties
Before looking at the two examples, let us brieﬂy reﬂect on what is expected.
A reasonable belief change mechanism would support the following:
• Suppose the agent believes v to be uniformly distributed on the interval
[0,10]. If the robot then uses its sonar and senses a value close to λ+δ say
5.9, it should come to believe that it is located at a door, which would
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xi. p(ι, S0) =
{
.1 if (h = 6 ∧ v ∈ [0, 10] ∧ θ = 0)[ι]
0 otherwise
Table 3. Certainty about θ
deﬂate its beliefs about every point not in [1, 2] ∪ [3, 4] ∪ [7, 8] (i.e. open
gaps in WallClose.).
• Suppose the robot moves 2 units away from the X axis and then uses
its sonar obtaining a reading of 5.8. It should then believe, rather con-
ﬁdently, that it must be in [3, 4] since that is the only trajectory that
supports a door initially and a second door after 2 units.
We now conﬁrm these intuitions below, which essentially amount to the
robot situating itself.
4.1. Knowing the Orientation
The ﬁrst case we study will be the simpler one among the examples. We
imagine (xi) from Table 3 to be the p speciﬁcation which says that the
agent believes v to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 10], h = 6
and θ = 0.5 This is a complete speciﬁcation, in the sense that a unique joint
distribution is provided. Moreover, owing to the exact knowledge that the
robot has about its orientation, it is very certain on when the sonar would
reach WallFar and when it would stop at WallClose, viz. the situations
where v ∈ [1, 2] or v ∈ [3, 4] or v ∈ [7, 8] are the only epistemically possible
ones where Blocked will not hold. Therefore, the agent initially believes v to
be uniform, as shown in Fig. 2, but after sensing 5.9, v values in the gaps will
be considered with high probability (and equally likely) while the remaining
v values will be given low p values.
Here are some properties of the basic action theory stated more formally:
Theorem 4.1. Let D be a basic action theory that includes the sentences in
Tables 2 and 3. Then:






= (ψ ⊃ z = t1) ∧ (¬ψ ⊃ z = t2).
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Figure 2. Beliefs initially and after sensing 5.9 when θ = 0
1. D |= Bel(v ∈ [3, 4.57], S0) = .157










p(ι, S0) ∃ι(h = x ∧ v = y ∧ θ = z ∧ v ∈ [3, 4.57])[ι]
0 otherwise










.1 ∃ι(h = x ∧ v = y ∧ θ = z ∧ . . .)[ι]
0 otherwise
where the ellipsis stands for:
(h = 6 ∧ v ∈ [0, 10] ∧ θ = 0) ∧ (v ∈ [3, 4.57])
Intuitively, for the numerator of Bel, we are to integrate a function
q(x, y, z) (where x corresponds to the ﬂuent h, y corresponds to the ﬂuent
v and z corresponds to the ﬂuent θ) that is .1 when y ∈ [3, 4.57] and 0
otherwise. This equals .157/γ. (The simpliﬁed mathematical expressions
in this example and the ones below can be calculated using any software
with numerical integration capabilities. We often write t ≈ u when the
calculation for an expression t gives u after truncating the resulting
value to two signiﬁcant digits.) The normalization factor γ, analogously,








.1 ∃ι (h = x ∧ v = y ∧ θ = z ∧ h = 6 ∧ v ∈ [0, 10] ∧ θ = 0)[ι]
0 otherwise
Here, v ∈ [3, 4.57] from the numerator is dropped (i.e. replaced by true).
It is easy to see that γ = 1 since y is integrated for all values.
Author's personal copy
V. Belle, H. J. Levesque
2. Bel(v ∈ [3, 4], do(sonar(5.9), S0)) ≈ .33










p(do(sonar(5.9), ι), do(sonar(5.9), S0)) if ∃ι(. . .)[ι]
0 otherwise
where the ellipsis stands for
h = x ∧ v = y ∧ θ = z ∧ v(do(sonar(5.9),now)) ∈ [3, 4].













.1 · N (δ + λ − 5.9; 0, 1) if ∃ι(. . . ∧ ψ)[ι]
.1 · N (δ − 5.9; 0, 1) if ∃ι(. . . ∧ ¬ψ)[ι]
0 otherwise
where, the ellipsis stands for
h = x ∧ v = y ∧ θ = z ∧
h = 6 ∧ v ∈ [0, 10] ∧ θ = 0 ∧
v(do(sonar(5.9),now)) ∈ [3, 4];
and ψ denotes
(v + tan θ ∈ [1, 2]) ∨ (v + tan θ ∈ [3, 4]) ∨ (v + tan θ ∈ [7, 8]).
The idea is simple. First, from (xi), those initial situations where
h = 6, θ = 0 and v ∈ [0, 10] are the only ones with non-zero p val-
ues. By means of (iii), for various real values of y, which is the variable
corresponding to v, we will be ranging over all the initial situations
with non-zero p values. Next, since we are interested in the belief in
v ∈ [3, 4], as in the previous item, we give all other successor situa-
tions a density of 0 when calculating the numerator. Third, we note
that when Blocked holds (tested using ψ), from (x) and (ii), p values get
multiplied by N (δ − 5.9; 0, 1), and when not, p values get multiplied by
N (δ + λ − 5.9; 0, 1). Analogously, for γ, we derive a similar formula by
replacing v(do(sonar(5.9),now)) ∈ [3, 4] in the conditional expressions
by true. As a ﬁnal simpliﬁcation in the numerator, because tan θ = 0,
the second condition in the case statement (with ¬ψ) is not satisﬁable,





.1 · N (.1; 0, 1) ≈ .33.
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xi. p(ι, S0) =
{
.1 × N (θ(ι); 0, 9) if (h = 6 ∧ v ∈ [0, 10])[ι]
0 otherwise
Table 4. Uncertainty about θ
4.2. Uncertainty About the Orientation
We now consider a more interesting p speciﬁcation determined by the orien-
tation. The p we are thinking of is the one speciﬁed in Table 4. Here, h = 6,
v is uniformly distributed as before, and independently θ is normally dis-
tributed around 0 with a variance of 9. This too is a complete speciﬁcation,
in the sense that there is a unique joint distribution corresponding to the p
axiom.
Consider for the moment what would happen after sensing once. Unlike
in Fig. 2, there is uncertainty regarding θ, which means that sensing (say)
5.9 will not imply full conﬁdence in v being in [1, 2]∪ [3, 4]∪ [7, 8]. Indeed, as
discussed earlier, even for v values less than 1, the orientation may cause the
sonar to sense WallFar. Moreover, a larger range of θ values may cause the
sonar to sense WallFar in the [3,4] interval rather than the [1,2] interval
due to its lack of wall obstructions, causing a belief density change as shown
in Fig. 3. After moving (say) 2 units and sensing values closer to λ + δ will
lead to a more deﬁnite localization, as also shown in Fig. 3.
Here are some properties of this second basic action theory:
Theorem 4.2. Let D be a basic action theory that includes the sentences in
Tables 2 and 4. Then:
1. D |= Bel(v ∈ [3, 4.57], S0) = .157
We are integrating under the same conditions initially as in the previous










.1 · N (z; 0, 1) if ∃ι. (h = x ∧ v = y ∧ θ = z ∧ . . .)[ι]
0 otherwise
where the ellipsis stands for
h = 6 ∧ v ∈ [0, 10] ∧ v ∈ [3, 4.57]
and where the distribution for θ is also considered in the density expres-
sion for initial situations. Here, because we are integrating θ for all values,
we obtain γ = 1 as usual, and so the above expression leads to .157.
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Figure 3. Belief change with normally distributed θ: after sensing 5.9,
moving 2 units after that, and sensing 5.83 ﬁnally
2. D |= Bel(v ∈ [3, 4], do(sonar(5.9), S0)) ≈ .31
D |= Bel(v ∈ [2.8, 4.2], do(sonar(5.9), S0)) ≈ .33
It is worth developing this in detail and contrasting it with what we had














N (.1; 0, 1) if ∃ι(. . . ∧ ψ)[ι]
N (4.9; 0, 1) if ∃ι(. . . ∧ ¬ψ)[ι]
0 otherwise
where (analogously) the ellipsis stands for:
h = x ∧ θ = z ∧ v = y ∧
h = 6 ∧ v ∈ [0, 10] ∧
v(do(sonar(5.9),now)) ∈ [3, 4]
and ψ is (exactly as before):
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(v + tan θ ∈ [1, 2]) ∨ (v + tan θ ∈ [3, 4]) ∨ (v + tan θ ∈ [7, 8]).
Note the simpliﬁcation of the l-values for the sensing action as follows:
N (δ + λ − 5.9; 0, 1) = N (.1; 0, 1),N (δ − 5.9; 0, 1) = N (4.9; 0, 1).
What is interesting about Bel’s expansion here is that since θ 
= 0, the
sensor may read δ + λ even if the robot is not located in [1, 2], [3, 4] and
[7, 8]. This accounts for belief in (say) exactly [3, 4] being less than 1/3,
which is diﬀerent from the previous example. Indeed, the degree of belief
in a slightly larger interval, such as [2.8, 4.2], approaches 1/3.
3. D |= Bel(v ∈ [3, 4], do([sonar(5.9),move(2, 90)], S0)) ≈ .31
Intuitively, the belief in [1, 2] after sensing 5.9, which is also slightly less
than 1/3 owing to the open door at [1, 2] and the uncertainty about θ,
is transferred to [3, 4] after moving laterally by 2 units. (That is, the new
values of the points in the interval [1, 2] correspond to the interval [3, 4]
and their densities do not change over a noise-free action.)
4. D |= Bel(v ∈ [3, 4],
do([sonar(5.9),move(2, 90), sonar(5.83)], S0)) ≈ .96
After sensing a value close to λ + δ, moving and sensing λ + δ again, the
robot is very conﬁdent about the [3, 4] interval. We will not expand Bel
completely but just point out that the density function is
.1 · N (z; 0, 9) · N (δ + λ − 5.9; 0, 1) · N(δ + λ − 5.83; 0, 1)
at initial situations where:
h = 6 ∧ v ∈ [0, 10] ∧
(v + tan θ ∈ [1, 2] ∨ v + tan θ ∈ [3, 4] ∨ v + tan θ ∈ [7, 8]) ∧
(v + tan θ + 2 ∈ [1, 2] ∨ v + tan θ + 2 ∈ [3, 4] ∨
v + tan θ + 2 ∈ [7, 8]).
Roughly speaking, these situations are those that support the observa-
tions of 5.9 and 5.83 in the best possible way. Note that, for the second
sensing action, we need to test whether the incremented value of v after
move(2, 90) is within a gap. It is not hard to see that when v is in the
vicinity of [3, 4], we would easily satisfy these constraints, which then has
the intended eﬀect.
4.3. Discussions
As seen in much of the work in cognitive robotics [33,46], a logical language
like the situation calculus allows for non-trivial action speciﬁcations, includ-
ing, for example, context-dependent prerequisites and eﬀects. In earlier
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work [5], we have demonstrated how such actions can aﬀect probability
distributions in interesting ways, such as transforming continuous distribu-
tions to mixed ones, and how the language leads itself for reasoning about
past and future events, among others.
Most signiﬁcantly, in comparison to standard (non-logical) probabilistic
formalisms, the advantages of our proposal are perhaps most evident in
terms of what is allowed in the initial speciﬁcation of the p ﬂuent. The two
examples used in the paper were comparable to unique joint probability
distributions, which are standard. But that is not the case for one of the
form:
∀ι(p(ι, S0) = U(v; 0, 10)[ι]) ∨ ∀ι(p(ι, S0) = U(v; 3, 13)[ι])
This says that the agent believes v to be uniformly distributed on [0, 10]
or on [3, 13], without being able to say which. (That is, the U term is an
abbreviation for the mathematical formula deﬁning a uniform density.) As
one would expect (in logic), appropriate beliefs will still be entailed. For
example:
• initially, it will follow that the robot is certain that v 
∈ [30, 40], and will
believe that v ∈ [3, 10] with a probability of .7;
• if the robot has sensors to indicate that it is well within (say) the range
of [7, 8], after a few sensor readings, the disjunctive uncertainty about v
will no longer be signiﬁcant.
Much weaker speciﬁcations are possible still, where the modeler may leave
the nature of the distribution of some ﬂuents completely open, which would
correspond more closely to incomplete information in the usual categorical
sense, among others. As an example, the sentence above in a language with
even one other ﬂuent, say h, would mean that the agent has no information
about the initial distribution of h. All of these are admitted in the framework.
5. Localization with Multiple Agents
In this section, we sketch how our logical account is extended to achieve
localization in a many agent setting, where agents can appeal to the sensing
actions they have individually performed to jointly situate themselves. In
particular, the situation we consider is one where a robot performs a sensing
action, and a second robot can inspect the outcome of this sensing action
and its position relative to the ﬁrst robot to localize itself. (A more drastic
reworking is to update the beliefs of the second robot entirely using the ﬁrst
robot’s beliefs, as in [21].)
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5.1. Multiple Agents in L
In terms of the logical language L, a multi-agent version of the underlying
model of belief is needed. In particular, we will need to reason about the
beliefs of the individual agents, which may diﬀer arbitrarily, as well as the
sensing information perceived by the agent who performs the action.
Let us begin by extending L to reason about multi-agent beliefs. Following
the work of [51] on categorical knowledge, we let the binary ﬂuent p(s′, s) be
replaced by a ternary one p(x, s′, s) where x denotes the agent. Intuitively,
p(x, s′, s) is the weight accorded to s′ by x when it is at s. The successor
state axiom for p, then, is retroﬁtted for the ternary version in an obvious
way:
p(x, s′, do(a, s)) = u ≡
∃s′′ [s′ = do(a, s′′) ∧ Poss(a, s′′)∧
u = p(x, s′′, s) × l(a, s′′)]
∨ ¬∃s′′ [s′ = do(a, s′′) ∧ Poss(a, s′′) ∧ u = 0].
This says that according to the agent x, the p-value of do(a, s) is obtained
from the p-value of s and the likelihood of the action a. Other p axioms in
the action theory are modiﬁed analogously.
When considering sensing actions in a multi-agent context, we make the
assumption that all actions are publicly observable, although the information
obtained on the sensors is (naturally) private. (See [30], for example, for
an account where the executability of actions is also private.) This can be
captured in L by means of an account of action nondeterminism. Following
the work of [18], we introduce a new distinguished predicate Alt(x, a, a′) to
mean that when a is executed, x imagines that a′ has occurred. We assume
the action theory to include axioms of the form:
Alt(x, a, a′) ≡ φ(a, a′).
In the simplest case, a and a′ are the same: Alt(x, a, a′) ≡ a = a′. We will see
examples of non-trivial Alt-axioms shortly on considering sensing actions.6
Putting it together, we let x’s degree of belief in φ be given by the fol-
lowing abbreviation:





Density(x, y, φ, s).
6This account of alternate actions can also be used to reason about noisy eﬀectors; see
[9]. It can also be made context dependent [18], in the sense that the action a′ would diﬀer
across situations. For simplicity, we omit this feature.
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where Density(x, y, φ, s) is an abbreviation that returns the density that x
associates with φ at s while accommodating Alt-related actions:
Density(x, y, φ, do(a, S0)) = u
.=
∃ι, b [∧ fi(ι)=yi ∧ Alt(x, a, b) ∧ φ[do(b, ι)] ∧ u=p(x, do(b, ι), do(a, S0))]
∨ ¬∃ι, b [∧ fi(ι) = yi ∧ Alt(x, a, b) ∧ φ[do(b, ι)] ∧ u = 0].
The normalization factor γ is obtained, as usual, by letting φ in the numer-
ator be replaced by true.
The Density term can be understood as follows. We allow for x believing
that b occurred although a was executed. But precisely because x believes
that b occurred, the property φ is tested at b-related successor situations,
and the likelihood of b is applied to these situations. (The abbreviation is
extended for action sequences in a straightforward way.)
5.2. Example Reconsidered
Let us imagine two robots r and r′, both along the vertical axis, as shown
in Fig. 4. Of course, then, while the description of the environment does not
change between the examples, we will need a natural extension to character-
ize the robots’ uncertainty, eﬀectors and sensors. So, in addition to ﬂuents
h, v and θ for the position of robot r, we introduce three companion ﬂuents
h′, v′ and θ′ for the position of robot r′.
To provide successor state axioms, let us suppose actions include a
parameter for the agent, that is, suppose move(x, z, w), rotate(x, z) and
sonar(x, z) are actions that aﬀect the agent x’s horizontal and vertical posi-
tions, x’s orientation and measures x’s distance to the walls, respectively.
Then, we retroﬁt the successor state axioms in an obvious way:
v(do(a, s)) = u ≡
¬∃z, w(a = move(r, z, w)) ∧ u = v(s) ∨
∃z, w(a = move(r, z, w) ∧ u = v(s) + z · sin(w)).
This says that move(r, z, w) is the only action aﬀecting v, and similarly:
v′(do(a, s)) = u ≡
¬∃z, w(a = move(r′, z, w)) ∧ u = v′(s) ∨
∃z, w(a = move(r′, z, w) ∧ u = v′(s) + z · sin(w))
says that move(r′, z, w) is the only action aﬀecting v′. Analogous deﬁnitions
are provided for h, h′, θ and θ′.
To summarize, the following changes were needed:
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Figure 4. The walls and two robots: r (in white) and r′ (in black)
• formulas (i) and (ii) from Table 1 are provided using a ternary version
of p;
• successor state axioms for h, v, θ, h′, v′ and θ′ are deﬁned wrt move(x, z, w),
rotate(x, z) and sonar(x, z).
However, formula (iii) from Table 1 remains unchanged as do the formulas
on the preconditions and the rigid predicate Solid(x, y, z) in Table 2. We
now turn to the likelihood axioms, Alt-axioms and the p-speciﬁcations for
the example.
5.3. Individual Localization
To begin with, let us consider the case where the two robots operate without
any communication. Suppose that both r and r′ are unsure of their position
along the vertical axis, and believe their vertical positions to be uniformly
distributed on the interval [0,10]. However, they do know that they are a
unit away from WallClose, as well as their relative pose information in
the following sense:
∀ι (v′(ι) = v(ι) + 2).
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So, initially, r′ is 2 units from r along the vertical axis. More precisely,
the initial theory is as given in Table 5, which says that x has knowledge of
h, h′, θ and θ′, and believes v and v′ are independently uniformly distributed
on [0,10]. Moreover, because x is universally quantiﬁed from the outside,
both robots have knowledge of this speciﬁcation.




.01 if (h = 6 ∧ h′ = 6 ∧ θ = 0 ∧ θ′ = 0 ∧
v ∈ [0, 10] ∧ v′ ∈ [0, 10] ∧ v′ = v + 2)[ι]
0 otherwise
Table 5. Two robots uncertain about their vertical position
To capture that actions are publicly observable whereas the information
obtained on the sensors is private, we provide the following Alt-axiom:
Alt(x, sonar(y, z), a′) ≡ (x = y ∧ a′ = sonar(y, z)) ∨ (x 
= y ∧ a′ = null).
This is to be read as follows. Suppose r executes the sonar action, and that
works as usual. From the perspective of r′, however, null has occurred, which
is a special action that has no eﬀects. Basically, the eﬀect of this Alt-axiom is
that the beliefs of r′ remain unchanged after sonar(r, 5) whereas the beliefs
of r are sharpened by means of the sonar’s likelihood axioms.
The sonar’s likelihood axioms are deﬁned as before; for example:
l(sonar(r, z), s) = u ≡
Blocked(s) ∧ u = N (δ/ cos(θ) − z; 0, 1)[s] ∨
¬Blocked(s) ∧ u = N ((δ + λ)/ cos(θ) − z; 0, 1)[s].
The likelihood for sonar(r′, z) is deﬁned in a symmetric manner using h′, v′,
and θ′. Of course, we also assume that for all actions outside of sensing
actions, including null, l(a, s) = 1 and Alt(x, a, a′) ≡ a = a′. Let D be a
basic action theory that is the union of these sentences.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose D is a basic action theory using the ternary p ﬂuent
and the axioms as described above. Then, the following are entailments of D:
1. D |= (Bel(r, v ∈ [1, 2], S0) = .1) ∧ (Bel(r′, v′ ∈ [3, 4], S0) = .1)
2. D |= Bel(r, v ∈ [1, 2], do(sonar(r, 6), S0)) ≈ .33









p(r, do(b, ι), do(sonar(r, 6), S0)) if ∃ι, b. ψ[ι]
0 otherwise
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where the integration variables range over {x, x′, y, y′, z, z′} and ψ stands
for:
h = x ∧ h′ = x′ ∧ v = y ∧ v′ = y′ ∧ θ = z ∧ θ′ = z′ ∧ v′ = v + 2 ∧
h = 6 ∧ h′ = 6 ∧ θ = 0 ∧ θ′ = 0 ∧ v ∈ [1, 10] ∧ v′ ∈ [1, 10] ∧
Alt(r, sonar(r, 6), b) ∧ v(do(sonar(r, 6),now)) ∈ [1, 2]











.01 · N (δ + λ − 6; 0, 1) if ∃ι(ψ ∧ ξ)[ι]
.01 · N (δ − 6; 0, 1) if ∃ι(ψ ∧ ¬ξ)[ι]
0 otherwise
where ξ denotes:
(v + tan θ ∈ [1, 2]) ∨ (v + tan θ ∈ [3, 4]) ∨ (v + tan θ ∈ [7, 8])
that corresponds to the sonar’s signals reaching WallFar. The beliefs of
r about v ∈ [1, 2], then, becomes ≈ .33.
3. D |= Bel(r′, v′ ∈ [3, 4], do(sonar(r, 6), S0)) = .1
The expansion proceeds analogously, except that Alt(r′, sonar(r, 6), b) is
true for b = null. Recall that its likelihood is 1, and so, the beliefs of r′
do not change. Thus, as in item 1, we get .1.
4. Bel(r′, v′ ∈ [3, 4], do([sonar(r, 6), sonar(r′, 6)], S0)) ≈ .33
While the beliefs of r′ in v′ ∈ [3, 4] are sharpened after sonar(r′, 6) in
a manner symmetric to item 2, no such improvement is obtained after
sonar(r, 6) owing to the likelihood and Alt-axioms (as in item 3).
5.4. Mutual Localization
We now consider the case where a robot might have performed a sensing
action, and a second robot can beneﬁt from the observed outcome and its
own position relative to the ﬁrst for localization. Inspired by [3,52], we con-
sider the notion of an announcement. For simplicity, we lump the announce-
ment and sensing features in a single action announce deﬁned by the follow-
ing likelihood axiom:
l(announce(x, z), s) = u ≡
Blocked(s) ∧ u = N (δ/ cos(θ) − z; 0, 1)[s] ∨
¬Blocked(s) ∧ u = N ((δ + λ)/ cos(θ) − z; 0, 1)[s].
together with the following Alt-axiom:
Alt(x, announce(y, z), a′) ≡ a′ = announce(y, z).
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Basically, announce(r, z) amounts to sensing and (implicitly) telling every
robot how the p-values of situations should change based on what r observed
and how that observation relates to the position of r. We can show:
Theorem 5.2. Let D be as in Theorem 5.1 with the addition of the
announcement action. Then:
D |= Bel(r′, v′ ∈ [3, 4], do([announce(r, 6), sonar(r′, 5.5)], S0)) ≈ .99













.01 · N (δ + λ − 6; 0, 1) · N (δ + λ − 5.5; 0, 1) if ∃ι, b, b′(ψ ∧ ξ ∧ ξ′)[ι]
.01 · N (δ + λ − 6; 0, 1) · N (δ − 5.5; 0, 1) if ∃ι, b, b′(ψ ∧ ξ ∧ ¬ξ′)[ι]
.01 · N (δ − 6; 0, 1) · N (δ + λ − 5.5; 0, 1) if ∃ι, b, b′(ψ ∧ ¬ξ ∧ ξ′)[ι]
.01 · N (δ − 6; 0, 1) · N (δ − 5.5; 0, 1) if ∃ι, b, b′(ψ ∧ ¬ξ ∧ ¬ξ′)[ι]
0 otherwise
and ψ denotes
h = x ∧ h′ = x ∧ v = y ∧ v′ = y′ ∧ θ = z ∧ θ′ = z ∧ v′ = v + 2 ∧
h = 6 ∧ h′ = 6 ∧ v ∈ [0, 10] ∧ v′ ∈ [0, 10] ∧ θ = 0 ∧ θ′ = 0 ∧
Alt(r′, announce(r, 6), b) ∧ Alt(r′, sonar(r′, 5.5), b′) ∧
v′(do([announce(r, 6), sonar(r′, 5.5)],now)) ∈ [3, 4]
and ξ denotes
(v + tan θ ∈ [1, 2]) ∨ (v + tan θ ∈ [3, 4]) ∨ (v + tan θ ∈ [7, 8])
and ξ′ denotes
(v′ + tan θ′ ∈ [1, 2]) ∨ (v′ + tan θ′ ∈ [3, 4]) ∨ (v′ + tan θ′ ∈ [7, 8]).
On simpliﬁcation, and on substituting v′ = v + 2, one would observe that
conditions other than ψ ∧ ξ ∧ ξ′ become false. Indeed, if ξ ∧ ξ′ holds, then
v ∈ [1, 2] and v′ ∈ [3, 4], and so ψ ∧ ξ ∧ ξ′ admits v′ ∈ [3, 4]. In contrast, for
example, ¬ξ′ does not admit v′ ∈ [3, 4], and so ψ ∧ ξ ∧¬ξ′ is false because ψ
requires v′ ∈ [3, 4]. Finally, the normalization factor is obtained by replacing
v′(do([announce(r, 6), sonar(r′, 5.5)],now)) ∈ [3, 4]
in ψ by true. All together, we obtain a value of .99.
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6. Related Work
There are three main strands of related work from the representational
aspect. They are probabilistic formalisms, relational probabilistic languages
and ﬁnally action languages. We discuss them in turn, but focus our atten-
tion on robot localization where possible.
There are numerous probabilistic formalisms, see [55] for a comprehen-
sive overview, some of which are at the heart of most traditional robotic
systems. Much of the results are algorithmic in nature, in the sense of inves-
tigating sampling-based techniques, approximating domains with Gaussian
distributions, and so on. At the outset, we mentioned already that this
paper is about a speciﬁcation. So, wrt the underlying formal characteriza-
tion, almost all of these are based on Bayesian conditioning [44]; see [19]
for early work, and [21] for a multi-agent version. They also assume a full
speciﬁcation of a joint distribution, speciﬁed compactly in the form of (say)
conjugate distributions such as Gaussians or dependency structures such as
Bayesian networks. Thus, in terms of methodology, none of these are geared
to handle strict uncertainty, logical connectives, and partial speciﬁcations.
Similar limitations also apply to early work on diagnosis in hybrid systems
[41]. Moreover, apart from a few cases such as [16] and [25] that are propo-
sitional, they do not reason about rich actions explicitly.
Logical formalisms for probabilistic reasoning, such as [1,27], are
equipped to handle features such as disjunctions and quantiﬁers, but they do
not explicitly address actions. Relational probabilistic languages and Markov
logics [43,47] also do not model actions. Recent temporal extensions, such as
[13], treat special cases such as Kalman ﬁltering, but not complex actions.
Similar limitations apply to certain fuzzy logic approaches for Bayesian ﬁl-
tering [29].
In this regard, action logics such as dynamic and process logics are closely
related. These, and other proposals for action and change [53], in fact, are
precisely the kind of logical languages we expect to be used for high-level
control. But most of the work in the area, to the best of our knowledge, is lim-
ited in terms of one or more of the following: (a) they are propositional, (b)
they have not been extended to handle noise that is continuous, and (c) they
have not formalized and studied how localization can be realized. For exam-
ple, in the area of dynamic logic, [56] treat probabilistic nondeterminism,
but (a), (b) and (c) hold here. Frameworks such as [26], and probabilistic
planning languages [32,48,57], are propositional. Finally, proposals based
on the situation and ﬂuent calculi are ﬁrst-order [2,4,11,22,39,45,50,53],
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but none of them deal with continuous noise. Also, (c) holds for these. We
remark that, among these ﬁrst-order formalisms, multi-agent accounts have
been previously considered [51,52], but collaborative localization has not
been addressed.
7. Conclusions and Outlook
This paper addresses a fundamental limitation when applying logical knowl-
edge representation formalisms to robotics. One is forced to abstract the
sensing results in a categorical fashion, or much worse, abandon its inner
workings. In that regard, this paper’s essential contribution was to explain
and suggest how the modeler may represent her domain in a basic action
theory, and how that gets further used to localize mobile robots. We think
this clariﬁcation and logical study is original, and not only is it fully com-
patible with existing probabilistic formalisms, but goes well beyond them
in allowing non-trivial actions and partial speciﬁcations. These expressive
capabilities are signiﬁcant, because they are the very reason why (ﬁrst-order)
logical languages are chosen for modeling and reasoning in the ﬁrst place.
Giving them up would not be preferable for many domain modelers.
An account of localization is, however, only a ﬁrst step for realizing gen-
eral mechanisms that situate autonomous agents. For example, a more ﬂex-
ible account would involve a robot discovering the environment on its own
[55], and how that can be realized in a basic action theory is an important
open question. Of course, for such logical theories to be useful on actual
physical robots, much work remains to be done on providing computing
machinery for implementing reasoning systems. In very recent work [6,8],
we have investigated ways to address the problem of projection in our frame-
work, where one is interested in the properties that hold after actions. Pro-
jection is fundamental in planning and high-level programming [46], and
is a major concern in reasoning about action [38]. In ongoing work [9], we
are also identifying fragments of our representation language that admit
real-time behavior.
Acknowledgements. This work was supported by the Natural Sciences and
Engineering Research Council of Canada. This article is an extended ver-
sion of one that appeared in Proceedings of the Conference on Autonomous
Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2014.
Author's personal copy
A Logical Theory of Localization
References
[1] Bacchus, F., Representing and Reasoning with Probabilistic Knowledge, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1990.
[2] Bacchus, F., J. Y. Halpern, and H. J. Levesque, Reasoning about noisy sensors
and eﬀectors in the situation calculus, Artificial Intelligence 111(1–2):171–208, 1999.
[3] Baltag, A., L. S. Moss, and S. Solecki, The logic of public announcements, common
knowledge, and private suspicions, in Proceedings of TARK, 1998, pp. 43–56.
[4] Belle, V., and G. Lakemeyer, A semantical account of progression in the presence
of uncertainty, in Proceedings of AAAI, 2011, pp. 165–170.
[5] Belle, V., and H. J. Levesque, Reasoning about continuous uncertainty in the
situation calculus, in Proceedings of IJCAI, 2013.
[6] Belle, V., and H. J. Levesque, Reasoning about probabilities in dynamic systems
using goal regression, in Proceedings of UAI, 2013.
[7] Belle, V., and H. J. Levesque, Robot location estimation in the situation calculus,
in Symposium on Logical Formalizations of Commonsense Reasoning, 2013.
[8] Belle, V., and H. J. Levesque, How to progress beliefs in continuous domains, in
Proceedings of KR, 2014.
[9] Belle, V., and H. J. Levesque, PREGO: An action language for belief-based cog-
nitive robotics in continuous domains, in Proceedings of AAAI, 2014.
[10] Billingsley, P., Probability and Measure, 3rd edn., Wiley-Interscience, New York,
1995.
[11] Boutilier, C., R. Reiter, M. Soutchanski, and S. Thrun, Decision-theoretic,
high-level agent programming in the situation calculus, in Proceedings of AAAI, 2000,
pp. 355–362.
[12] Burgard, W., A. B. Cremers, D. Fox, D. Ha¨hnel, G. Lakemeyer, D. Schulz,
W. Steiner, and S. Thrun, Experiences with an interactive museum tour-guide
robot, Artificial Intelligence 114(1–2):3–55, 1999.
[13] Choi, J., A. Guzman-Rivera, and E. Amir, Lifted relational Kalman ﬁltering, in
Proceedings of IJCAI, 2011, pp. 2092–2099.
[14] Cox, I. J., Blanche—An experiment in guidance and navigation of an autonomous
robot vehicle, IEEE Transactions on Robotics and Automation 7(2):193–204, 1991.
[15] Da Prato, G., An Introduction to Infinite-Dimensional Analysis, Universitext,
Springer, 2006.
[16] Darwiche, A., and M. Goldszmidt, Action networks: A framework for reasoning
about actions and change under uncertainty, in Proceedings of UAI, 1994, pp. 136–144.
[17] De Giacomo, G., and H. J. Levesque, Two approaches to eﬃcient open-world rea-
soning, in Logic-Based Artificial Intelligence, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell,
MA, 2000, pp. 59–78.
[18] Delgrande, J. P., and H. J. Levesque, A formal account of nondeterministic and
failed actions, in IJCAI, 2013.
[19] Dellaert, F., D. Fox, W. Burgard, and S. Thrun, Monte carlo localization for
mobile robots, in Proceedings Robotics and Automation, vol. 2, IEEE, 1999, pp. 1322–
1328.
Author's personal copy
V. Belle, H. J. Levesque
[20] Fagin, R., and J. Y. Halpern, Reasoning about knowledge and probability, Journal
of the ACM 41(2):340–367, 1994.
[21] Fox, D., W. Burgard, H. Kruppa, and S. Thrun, A probabilistic approach to
collaborative multi-robot localization, Autonomous Robots 8(3):325–344, 2000.
[22] Gabaldon, A., and G. Lakemeyer, ESP: A logic of only-knowing, noisy sensing and
acting, in Proceedings of AAAI, 2007, pp. 974–979.
[23] Ge, X., and J. Renz, Representation and reasoning about general solid rectangles, in
IJCAI, 2013.
[24] De Giacomo, G., L. Iocchi, D. Nardi, and R. Rosati, Moving a robot: The kr &
r approach at work, in Proceedings of KR, 1996, pp. 198–209.
[25] Hajishirzi, H., and E.Amir, Reasoning about deterministic actions with probabilistic
prior and application to stochastic ﬁltering, in Proceedings of KR, 2010.
[26] Halpern, J. Y., and M. R. Tuttle, Knowledge, probability, and adversaries, Journal
of the ACM 40:917–960, 1993.
[27] Halpern, J. Y., An analysis of ﬁrst-order logics of probability, Artificial Intelligence
46(3):311–350, 1990.
[28] Hintikka, J., Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1962.
[29] Jetto, L., S. Longhi, and D. Vitali, Localization of a wheeled mobile robot by
sensor data fusion based on a fuzzy logic adapted Kalman ﬁlter, Control Engineering
Practice 7(6):763–771, 1999.
[30] Kelly, R. F., and A. R. Pearce, Asynchronous knowledge with hidden actions in
the situation calculus, Artificial Intelligence 221:1–35, 2015.
[31] Kripke, S., Semantical considerations on modal logic, Acta Philosophica Fennica
16:83–94, 1963.
[32] Kushmerick, N., S.Hanks, and D. S.Weld, An algorithm for probabilistic planning,
Artificial Intelligence 76(1):239–286, 1995.
[33] Lakemeyer, G., and H. J. Levesque, Cognitive robotics, in Handbook of Knowledge
Representation, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007, pp. 869–886.
[34] Lee, J. H., J. Renz, and D. Wolter, Starvars—Eﬀective reasoning about relative
directions, in Francesca Rossi, (ed.), IJCAI, IJCAI/AAAI, 2013.
[35] Levesque, H. J., and R. Reiter, High-level robotic control: Beyond planning, Posi-
tion paper at AAAI Spring Symposium on Integrating Robotics Research, 1998.
[36] Levesque, H. J., R. Reiter, Y. Lespe´rance, F. Lin, and R. Scherl, Golog: A logic
programming language for dynamic domains, Journal of Logic Programming 31:59–84,
1997.
[37] Levesque, H. J., F. Pirri, and R. Reiter, Foundations for the situation calculus,
Electronic Transactions in Artificial Intelligence 2:159–178, 1998.
[38] Lin, F., and R. Reiter, How to progress a database, Artificial Intelligence 92(1–
2):131–167, 1997.
[39] Mateus, P., A. Pacheco, J. Pinto, A. Sernadas, and C. Sernadas, Probabilistic
situation calculus, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 32(1–4):393–431,
2001.
Author's personal copy
A Logical Theory of Localization
[40] McCarthy, J., and P. J. Hayes, Some philosophical problems from the standpoint
of artiﬁcial intelligence, in Machine Intelligence, 1969, pp. 463–502.
[41] McIlraith, S., G. Biswas, D. Clancy, and V. Gupta, Hybrid systems diagnosis, in
Proceedings of Workshop on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control, LNCS, 2000,
pp. 282–295.
[42] Moore, R. C., A formal theory of knowledge and action, in Formal Theories of the
Commonsense World, Ablex, Norwood, NJ, 1985, pp. 319–358.
[43] Ng, R., and V. S. Subrahmanian, Probabilistic logic programming, Information and
Computation 101(2):150–201, 1992.
[44] Pearl, J., Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Infer-
ence, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1988.
[45] Poole, D., Decision theory, the situation calculus and conditional plans, Electronic
Transactions in Artificial Intelligence 2:105–158, 1998.
[46] Reiter, R., Knowledge in Action: Logical Foundations for Specifying and Implement-
ing Dynamical Systems, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001.
[47] Richardson, M., and P. Domingos, Markov logic networks, Machine learning
62(1):107–136, 2006.
[48] Sanner, S., Relational dynamic inﬂuence diagram language (rddl): Language descrip-
tion, Technical Report, Australian National University, 2011.
[49] Scherl, R. B., and H. J. Levesque, Knowledge, action, and the frame problem,
Artificial Intelligence 144(1–2):1–39, 2003.
[50] Shapiro, S., Belief change with noisy sensing and introspection, in NRAC Workshop,
2005, pp. 84–89.
[51] Shapiro, S., Y. Lespe´rance, and H. J. Levesque, The cognitive agents speciﬁca-
tion language and veriﬁcation environment for multiagent systems, in Proceedings of
AAMAS, 2002, pp. 19–26.
[52] Shapiro, S., Y. Lespe´rance, and H. J. Levesque, Goal change, in Proceedings
IJCAI, 2005, pp. 582–588.
[53] Thielscher, M., Planning with noisy actions (preliminary report), in Proceedings of
the Australian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2001, pp. 27–45.
[54] Thielscher, M., Flux: A logic programming method for reasoning agents, Theory
and Practice of Logic Programming 5(4–5):533–565, 2005.
[55] Thrun, S., W. Burgard, and D. Fox, Probabilistic Robotics, MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, 2005.
[56] Van Benthem, J., J. Gerbrandy, and B. Kooi, Dynamic update with probabilities,
Studia Logica 93(1):67–96, 2009.
[57] Younes, H., and M. Littman, PPDDL 1.0: An extension to pddl for expressing plan-
ning domains with probabilistic eﬀects, Technical Report, Carnegie Mellon University,
2004.
Author's personal copy
V. Belle, H. J. Levesque
V. Belle, H. J. Levesque
Department of Computer Science
University of Toronto
Toronto, ON M5S 3H5
Canada
vaishak@cs.toronto.edu
H. J. Levesque
hector@cs.toronto.edu
Author's personal copy
